# For the Northern District of California

IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT

# FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WANXIA LIAO,	No. C 05-1888 CW		
Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S		
V.	MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION		
RONALD QUIDACHAY, et al.,	FOR		
Defendants.	RECONSIDERATION		

Plaintiff has filed a document entitled "Motion for Revocation of Order; for Re-Assignment of Case" (Docket No. 33). The Court will treat this as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of both the Court's Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Recusal (Docket No. 30) and the Court's Order for Plaintiff to File Proof of Service (Docket No. 32). Having considered all of the papers filed by the Plaintiff, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.

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# BACKGROUND

This complaint is based on an underlying civil rights lawsuit brought against James Cahill, a former professor at the University of California. In this complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Superior Court judges, the Honorable Ronald Quidachay and the Honorable Paul Alvarado, engaged in a cover-up for Mr. Cahill and intentionally sabotaged Plaintiff's case against him. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Superior Court clerk Maura Ramirez fraudulently sought to have Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants California Court of Appeal justices, the Honorable Laurence Kay, the Honorable Timothy Reardon, the Honorable Patricia Sepulveda and the Honorable Maria Rivera, conspired with Mr. Cahill to deprive Plaintiff of her due process rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant California Supreme Court Chief Justice the Honorable Ronald George has deprived Plaintiff of her due process rights. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages for her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for her State law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On October 22, 2005, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Declaration to Disqualify Judge Wilken," requesting that the undersigned recuse herself from the case. On November 15, 2005, the Court denied the motion, holding that Plaintiff's allegations of impartiality were insufficient as a matter of law. On November 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Supplemental Declaration of Bias and Prejudice of Judge Wilken."

Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on November

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1, 2005. To date, Defendants have not filed an answer. Plaintiff did not file proof of service of the SAC.

On September 11, 2006, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file proof that she properly served Defendants, or that she asked them to waive service, within twenty days of the order. In response to the order, Plaintiff filed the present motion.

### LEGAL STANDARD

"No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion." Civil Local Rule 7-9(a). A motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may only be granted if the moving party shows:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence of new material facts or change of law occurring after the time of such order; or (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.

Civil L.R. 7-9(b).

### DISCUSSION

Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Recusal

Plaintiff contends that she filed her "Supplement Declaration of Bias and Prejudice of Judge Wilken" with this Court after denial of her first request for recusal in order to clarify that the recusal request was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 rather than 28 U.S.C. § 455, upon which the Court based its order. She argues that the two statutes set forth different standards for disqualification. Therefore, she argues, the Court failed to

consider the legal arguments she presented in the first request for recusal.

"The test for personal bias or prejudice in section 144 is identical to that in section 455(b)(1) . . . [c]onsequently, a motion properly brought pursuant to section 144 will raise a question concerning recusal under section 455(b)(1) as well as section 144." United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the test for personal bias is the same in §§ 144 and 455(a) and (b)(1), the procedural requirements of the sections are different. Id. A motion filed under § 144 should prompt the judge to determine independently whether the circumstances call for recusal under the self-enforcing provisions of § 455 (a) and (b)(1), which rests within the sound discretion of the judge. Id. at 868. Because the test for personal bias is the same under §§ 144 and 455, the Court properly applied the standard set forth in § 455 when ruling on Plaintiff's request.

Furthermore, the Court properly followed the procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 144. When a party files a timely and sufficient affidavit of bias or prejudice of the judge before whom the party's case is pending, the judge shall proceed no further in the case until the judge passes on the affidavit's legal sufficiency. 28 U.S.C. § 144; Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1922). Only after the judge determines that the affidavit of bias or prejudice is legally sufficient does it become the duty of the judge to "proceed no further" in the case. United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978).

In the November 15, 2006 order, the Court determined that

Plaintiff's statements in her declaration were not legally sufficient to demonstrate bias. Plaintiff alleged that the undersigned dismissed Plaintiff's action "without any justifiable factual and legal grounds" and stated that this dismissal demonstrates that the undersigned is prejudiced against Plaintiff. (November 15, 2005 Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Recusal at 2.) However, adverse rulings are not sufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate that a judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned. United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Court was therefore not required to "proceed no further" in the case. Rather, it was permissible for the Court to rule on the request and deny it. Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown no basis for reconsideration of the Court's Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Recusal.

II. Order for Plaintiff to File Proof of Service

Plaintiff argues that this Court must rescind its Order for Plaintiff to File Proof of Service because it had no jurisdiction to issue the order after Plaintiff filed her request under 28 U.S.C. § 144. However, as discussed above, the Court permissibly ruled on the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations of bias and prejudice and found them insufficient. Therefore, the Court exercised jurisdiction over this case when it issued the order for proof of service. Accordingly, Plaintiff has provided no basis for reconsideration of that order.

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

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Within twenty days of this order, Plaintiff must file proof that					
she mailed copies of the SAC to the attorney of record for					
Defendants the Honorable Ronald Quidachay, the Honorable Paul					
Alvarado and Maura Ramirez. Additionally, within twenty days of					
this order, Plaintiff must file proof that she properly served					
Defendants the Honorable Laurence Kay, the Honorable Timothy					
Reardon, the Honorable Patricia Sepulveda, the Honorable Maria					
Rivera, and the Honorable Ronald George. If Plaintiff fails to					
provide such proof, the SAC will be dismissed for failure to					
prosecute. Furthermore, under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of					
Civil Procedure, if Plaintiff did not serve the SAC within 120 days					
after filing it, she must show good cause for failing to do so.					
<u>See</u> F. R. Civ P. 4(m).					
IT IS SO ORDERED.					

Dated: 10/25/06

Claudidvillen

CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge